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 SENSOR DATA QUALITY AND ANGULAR RATE DOWN-
SELECTION ALGORITHMS ON SLS EM-1 
Thomas Park*, Emerson Oliver†, Austin Smith‡ 
The NASA Space Launch System Block 1 launch vehicle is equipped with an 
Inertial Navigation System (INS) and multiple Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGA) that 
are used in the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) algorithms.  The INS 
provides the inertial position, velocity, and attitude of the vehicle along with both 
angular rate and specific force measurements.  Additionally, multiple sets of co-
located rate gyros supply angular rate data.  The collection of angular rate data, 
taken along the launch vehicle, is used to separate out vehicle motion from flexi-
ble body dynamics.  Since the system architecture uses redundant sensors, the 
capability was developed to evaluate the health (or validity) of the independent 
measurements.  A suite of Sensor Data Quality (SDQ) algorithms is responsible 
for assessing the angular rate data from the redundant sensors.  When failures are 
detected, SDQ will take the appropriate action and disqualify or remove faulted 
sensors from forward processing.  Additionally, the SDQ algorithms contain logic 
for down-selecting the angular rate data used by the GN&C software from the set 
of healthy measurements.  This paper provides an overview of the algorithms used 
for both fault-detection and measurement down selection. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Space Launch System (SLS) is equipped with multiple Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGAs) 
along the body of the space vehicle.  Each RGA consists of two orthogonal gyroscopes as well as 
supporting electronics.  Three such pairs of RGAs are co-located on a common isolated member at 
two locations in the SLS vehicle.  The responsibility of checking the health of the three independent 
measurements as well as consolidating, or down-selecting, a single rate measurement lies within a 
suite of Sensor Data Quality (SDQ) algorithms hosted in the navigation module of the SLS Flight 
Software.  The suite of SDQ algorithms validates the angular rate data from the RGAs by analyzing 
the measured angular rate data from the respective gyros as well as data from the internally redun-
dant Inertial Navigation System (INS), the corresponding timetags of the RGA and INS measure-
ments, as well as the Data Quality Indicators (DQI) derived from the self-reported health and status 
messages from the inertial sensor hardware. 
The algorithms that comprise SDQ can be grouped into two broad categories:  functions that 
detect failures and those functions that respond to failures.  The SDQ algorithms responsible for 
failure detection are the DQI check, the Timetag Check (TC), the Redundancy Check (RC) and the 
Box Comparison Check (BCC).  The response to any detected failures occurs in the SDQ Decision 
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Manager (DM).  The DM uses the strike counters from the detection functions in order to set inter-
nal DQI values based on configurable persistence limits. Lastly, the Selection Filter (SF) nominally 
consolidates the angular rate data from the three co-located RGAs into a single set of body-pitch 
and body-yaw angular rate measurements using a modified mid-value selection scheme.  Addition-
ally, the SDQ is responsible for setting sensor failure indicators for Guidance, Controls, and other 
redundancy management modules in SLS Flight Software.  The ﬂow through each of the SDQ 
modules is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1- Data flow through navigation SDQ. 
Each of the SDQ checks is conﬁgurable using software-loadable thresholds to denote the failure 
of a check, and communicates any detected failures to the DM by incrementing check-speciﬁc 
error/strike counters. The DM checks each of the strike counters against a software-loadable per-
sistency value---an RGA must fail a check for a specified number of consecutive frames before any 
action is taken. 
 These configurable parameters are further discretized into flight phases:  a different set of de-
tection thresholds are used during each phase. Each SDQ flight phase (not to be confused with 
mission phase or software mode) is scheduled based on navigated altitude---analysis during the 
SLS design and verification cycles has shown that altitude is more correlated to changes in dynam-
ics than other potential scheduling variables, e.g., time.  In contrast to the SDQ thresholds, the 
persistency values are not phase dependent; the same persistency conﬁguration for each check re-
mains in effect for the duration of ﬂight. In addition to altitude-based scheduling, the SDQ thresh-
olds are altered when SDQ enters a saﬁng mode.  This SDQ saﬁng mode is designed to allow a set 
of relaxed thresholds to be activated in the event of a Core Stage engine failure and during planned 
engine shutdown events. 
The next several sections describe the various SDQ failure detection algorithms and the corre-
sponding thresholds.  Next, details of the DM and RGA selection algorithm are provided. A dis-
cussion follows of the methodology for determining the SDQ flight phases and the thresholds used 
in each phase.  The current work concludes with a brief overview of a lesson-learned from early 




The RGAs perform a robust set of Built-In Tests (BIT) on the gyros, as well as on the sensor 
processing electronics.  BIT failure indicators from each RGA are consolidated by input data han-
dlers in the SLS Flight Software.  Additionally, the INS provides indication of failures from its own 
internal redundancy management software. These data handlers also assess the message integrity 
of each message, checking for both valid messages and stale data.  Based on the consolidated BIT 
data and 1553 communications check, each RGA is marked as having a valid or an invalid DQI. 
The SDQ DQI check marks any RGA with an invalid DQI and increments the appropriate strike 
counter associated with the failed RGA.  
The INS contains sufficient redundant management provisions—both in hardware and soft-
ware—to allow the SLS vehicle to complete its mission even after failure of one accelerometer and 
one gyro in the INS.  While fault management algorithms in SLS Flight Software monitor for single 
failures of the INS—and report on failures in telemetry—the GNC is only notified once the INS 
has failed sufficiently—loss of required function—to affect mission.  The input data handlers mon-
itor the INS for multiple-failure events and set an invalid DQI on the INS measurements.  When 
the INS DQI is invalid, the DQI check increments the corresponding strike counter.  In this case, 
the navigation software will publish an indication that the INS has failed so that guidance and 
controls can take appropriate action. 
TIMETAG CHECK 
The SDQ Timetag Check (TC) determines whether the timetags reported from the RGAs and 
the INS are within expected bounds, i.e., that the timetags are not duplicated (stale data) from one 
minor frame to the next and that the timetags vary from minor frame to minor frame within 
conﬁgurable limits. It is not unexpected for the RINU and RGA to have stale data periodically in 
ﬂight due to the asynchronous nature of communication between the Flight Computers and the 
avionics boxes with independent clocks. Separate strike counters are maintained for each RGA. 
REDUNDANCY CHECK 
For a given mounting location, the three co-located RGAs will experience the same vehicle 
dynamics.  Therefore, any difference in measured angular rates for each axis should be bounded by 
the gyro instrument error speciﬁcation. To mitigate the effects of output noise in the comparisons, 
the angular rates are first filtered with a critically damped 4 Hz filter.  This 4 Hz filter eliminates 
any unmodeled effects from high frequency dynamics or from simulation artifacts in the modeling 
of flexible body dynamics and focuses the comparison on a frequency band in which the dynamics 
are well characterized.  
For each RGA mounting location, the filtered rates are differenced to form three pairs of rate 
differences per axis. For either input axis of an RGA, the two pair-wise differences (between it and 
the other two co-located RGAs) for two healthy gyro should be bounded by a pre-determined 
threshold.  If either of the differences are above the threshold, an error is detected on that axis of 
the RGA.  The RC increments an internal strike counter if a fault is detected on either axis.  Due to 
the nature of the comparison logic, faults can be detected on only one or all three RGAs in a par-
ticular mounting location.   
BOX COMPARISON CHECK 
Whereas the Redundancy Check assesses the consistency of the angular rates at a specific loca-
tion on the vehicle, the Box Comparison Check (BCC) compares rate data across all three sensor 
locations at which inertial measurements are available, i.e., at the two RGA locations and at the 
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INS location.  The BCC operates on angular rates from each of the two down-selected RGAs (se-
lection from the previous computational frame) as well as from the INS.   
The angular rates from the three sources are first filtered with a critically damped 1 Hz filter.  
This 1 Hz filter was chosen for the BCC to dampen out all flexible body dynamics. According to 
the Space Launch System Program Integrated Guidance, Navigation, and Control Performance As-
sessment1, the first bending mode is around 1.4-1.5 Hz. Thus, a 1 Hz filter should attenuate flex 
transients, flexible body dynamics, and all other high frequency content. The only content left that 
can lead to an error detection in the angular rate measurements are quasi-static instrument errors 
and low frequency errors like random walk and gyro bias. 
The filtered rates are then differenced to form three pairs of rate differences (per axis and per 
sensor location).  For each sensor axis measurement, the differences between it and that of the other 
two sensors are compared against a pre-determined threshold. For an RGA (location), if these fil-
tered rate differences exceed this threshold, the BCC increments the strike counter for that RGA 
location.  If the rate differences exceed the thresholds for both RGAs, the results of the BCC are 
invalidated by marking all sensors as passing the BCC.  In this case, the reduced redundancy of the 
measurements directly impacts the observability of failures.  Also, since the  INS is considered a 
trusted source—owing to the hardware and software redundancy provisions internal to the box—if 
the rate differences associated with the INS exceed the detection thresholds, the results of the BCC 
are invalidated by marking all sensors as passing the BCC. 
DECISION MANAGER 
The Decision Manager (DM) is responsible for assessing the strike counters from each of the 
SDQ detection algorithms—the Data Quality Check, the Timetag Check, the Redundancy Check, 
and the Box Comparison Check.  Each of the SDQ strike counters have two associated persistency 
limits that determine (a) the minimum number of strikes/frames that must occur before a temporary 
failure is declared and (b) the maximum number of strikes/frames before which a permanent failure 
is declared for a given RGA or the INS.  
Depending on the individual strike counters the DM can be conﬁgured to either (a) permanently 
fail sensors on detection of any error, (b) to temporarily fail a sensor with the possibility of recovery 
in a subsequent computational frame, or (c) temporarily fail a sensor with the possibility of recovery 
but also allowing for permanent failure based on a secondary (conﬁgurable) persistence value. De-
pending on conﬁguration, the DM can allow recovery of a sensor by clearing that sensor’s failure 
status if no faults have been detected by the checks for a conﬁgurable amount of time. 
The result of the DM is that any sensor with error counters in excess of the persistence limits 
are marked as disqualified/failed.  These screened failure indicators are used in the Selection Filter. 
 
RGA DOWN SELECTION 
The RGA Selection Filter (SF) is responsible for selecting an (un-failed) RGA to use for the 
angular rate measurements at that location in the vehicle.  The SF uses the indicators from Decision 
Manager, along with the angular rate data from the non-failed RGAs at each location to perform 
this selection.  
When no RGA (at a location) is marked as failed, a modified Mean-Value Selection algorithm 
is used.  The selection ﬁlter computes the squares of the pair-wise differences between the angular 
rates from each RGA and chooses the channel whose measurements lie between the other two. 
Defining the rate differences as, 
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Δ0,1 = ?⃗? 𝑅𝐺𝐴0 − ?⃗? 𝑅𝐺𝐴1 
Δ0,2 = ?⃗? 𝑅𝐺𝐴0 − ?⃗? 𝑅𝐺𝐴2 
Δ1,2 = ?⃗? 𝑅𝐺𝐴1 − ?⃗? 𝑅𝐺𝐴2 



























These squared magnitudes in Equation (1) are used by the SF to select the RGA whose pair-
wise differences are the smallest.  The full logic is detailed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Selection scheme for the no RGA failure case.  The square-magnitudes are com-
pared pair-wise in a modified Mean Value Selection. 





























This selection logic is also used in the unlikely event that all RGAs are marked as failed.  This 
event will also cause the navigation software to assert a failure condition signifying that no reliable 
rate data is available for that RGA location.  The vehicle controller will re-configure any rate blend-
ing scheme to de-emphasize the affected rate measurements.  Additionally, fault management pro-
cessing in other partitions of SLS Flight Software will issue appropriate caution or warning mes-
sages.  This indication of all RGA failure may be removed provided that at least one RGA is re-
admitted on a subsequent frame. 
If only one or two RGAs have failed, the Selection Filter will use a sensor priority system.  Each 
RGA is assigned an arbitrary and configurable priority index as a part of the software-configurable 
parameters.  The SF will select the un-failed RGA with highest priority index.  This way, the SF 
remains deterministic software and will never chose a random RGA’s angular rate data. 
SDQ PHASE DETERMINATION 
Because the vehicle’s flexible body and trajectory dynamics vary over the course of flight, the 
SDQ error detection thresholds should change accordingly. Analysis during the SLS design and 
verification cycles has shown that altitude is more correlated to changes in dynamics than other 
potential scheduling variables, e.g., time. This ability to change thresholds as a function of vehicle 
altitude allows for a more robust detection capability by using looser detection thresholds during  
more dynamic flight phases, e.g., at liftoff and max-Q, while using tighter thresholds during less 
volatile times of flight. 
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The SDQ threshold phases are set based upon similar flight phases as determined by bounding 
cases of the vehicle pitch profile.  A notional profile of the min/max pitch rate versus altitude is 
illustrated in Figure 2.   The altitude-based phases are determined by first enveloping the pitch rates 
on each of ten subintervals.  The bounds of the subintervals are adjusted so that the total area en-
closed is minimized.  Additionally, for the case illustrated in Figure 2, the two altitude bands indi-
cated with green arrows shown were combined into one single phase due to the much larger rate 
bounding box to the right of the combined altitude phases. Combining these two altitude phases 
allows for a decrease in the chance for false positives.  
 
 
Figure 2 The minimum and maximum pitch rate versus altitude data along with the alti-
tude-based SDQ flight phases.  The two indicated phases were merged using the min/max 





SDQ THRESHOLDS AND MARGIN 
Eight separate SLS vehicle configurations were examined during the most recent Verification 
Analysis Cycle.  For each configuration, a set of nominal (no failure) Monte Carlo runs were used 
to envelope the no-failure behavior of the angular rate data.  An analysis was performed on these 
simulation results to determine the minimal SDQ error detection thresholds—the smallest possible 
threshold values the SDQ checks can have for a defined SLS vehicle before an error is detected 
incorrectly (zero-margin thresholds).  The analysis revealed that the zero-margin thresholds for 
each of different configurations are not that different. The zero-margin thresholds across the dif-
ferent configurations are illustrated by the horizontal bars near the center of the SDQ altitude phases 
in Figure 3.  
For the purpose of setting SDQ thresholds for this analysis cycle, the zero-margin thresholds 
for a specific configuration were scaled such that the resulting values enveloped the thresholds for 
all cases with significant margin.  The resulting thresholds, with margin, are illustrated by the green 
bars in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 The zero-margin thresholds for each altitude phase along with the scaled 
thresholds used across all configurations.   
 
The low-pass filters used in the Redundancy Check and in the Box Comparison Check, in addi-
tion to attenuating undesired frequency content, reduce the corresponding thresholds in each of the 
altitude-based phases.   Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate this reduction in the thresholds.  The thresh-
olds generated without using any pre-filter are shown in blue.  The corresponding thresholds when 
the angular rates are filtered with 4 Hz and 1 Hz filters are shown in green and cyan, respectively.  
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Even though the effects of both filters are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5, the Redundancy Check 
only uses the 4 Hz filter, while the Box Comparison Check only uses the 1 Hz filter. 
 
Figure 4 Effects of using a low-pass filter on the angular rate measurements in the Re-
dundancy Check.   
 
Figure 5 Effects of using a low-pass filter on the angular rate measurements in Box Com-
parison Check.   
LESSON LEARNED FROM HARDWARE-IN-THE-LOOP-TESTING 
During software integration testing with the INS engineering unit, the SDQ Timetag Check was 
erroneously disqualifying the INS.  After carefully analyzing the buffered timetags of the INS com-
pared to the INS timetags reported by the Flight Computer (FC), it was discovered that the FC was 
occasionally missing samples. 
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The SLS FC communicates with the INS over an asynchronous MIL-STD-1553B data bus.  The 
FC is the master clock for the vehicle.  While adjusting timetags based on the time broadcast mes-
sage from the FC, the INS uses a free-running clock for inertial measurement processing.  These 
independent clocks will drift pass one another.  When the frame boundaries cross, the FC will either 
miss an INS sample or will pull an old/stale sample.  When these clocks are not precisely the same 
the flight computer will either miss INS samples or report duplicated samples.   
Figure 6 illustrates four scenarios involving clocks.  At the top of the figure, the FC’s and INS’ 
clocks are synced resulting in the FC always receiving the most up-to-date data.   The next scenario 
in Figure 6 is that of asynchronous but identically behaved clocks—there is a fixed offset between 
the INS updates and the FC polling for data.  In this, nearly ideal, scenario, no samples are missed 
nor repeated.  In practice, independent clocks in an asynchronous system will have different drift 
rates.   The last two scenarios in Figure 6 illustrate the two cases resulting from the FC running 
faster than the INS—in this case samples will be repeated— and with the FC running slower than 
the INS—in this case new samples are missed.   
The jitter in the clock signals compounds the problem of missing or repeating samples from the 
as the FC and INS frame boundaries close in on one another.  If the drift rates of the clocks are very 
similar, the dwell time during a frame crossing can be significant.  During this dwell time, the FC 
will bounce between missing and repeating the INS samples.  This back-and-forth behavior is ob-
served by examining the difference in the FC and INS timetags around a frame crossing.  Figure 7 
illustrates these timetag differences from a HWIL test.  The slope of the difference gives a measure 
of the relative drift rates between the two clocks.  The inset in Figure 7 highlights the effects of 
jitter in the two timetags. 
A simulation model was created to assist in characterizing the uncertainty in the timetag incre-
ments from frame-to-frame.  This model was used to adjust the thresholds and persistency limits in 
the Timetag Check.  Using the navigated state from the INS—rather than integrating the incremen-
tal angles and incremental velocities in the SLS navigation software—reduces the sensitivity of 
missed or skipped INS data.  However, for the Block 1B family of vehicles, the SLS navigation 
software integrates the 𝑑𝑣s and 𝑑𝜃s directly.  This timing model allows for testing of the Block 1B 
integration algorithms when presented with skipped and duplicate samples. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The SLS Block-1 vehicle uses redundant rate gyroscopes in two different locations.  The navi-
gation team developed, implemented, and tested a suite of SDQ algorithms to detect and isolate 
sensor failures.  These error detection algorithms are driven by software-configurable thresholds 
developed using Monte-Carlo simulations.  When no failures are detected a modified mid-value 
selection algorithm selects the angular rates from an RGA at that location for forward processing.  
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Figure 6 FC Perfect Sample INS 
 
 
Figure 7 Example of FC and INS Async Event 
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